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Abstract
In this paper, I aim to show that Skeptical Theism (ST) implies the rejection of 
Free Will Skepticism (FWS). This is so because ST holds the so-called evidential 
argument from evil against theism. This argument presupposes free will (as 
a hidden premise), conducting this way to a skeptical conclusion without 
questioning the plausibility of FWS in the first place. I argue that this kind of 
conflict between two skeptical scenarios removes the validity of ST and FWS: 
It is ad hoc to assume a skeptical scenario S1 (ST) that supports thesis T1, and 
implicitly rejects the consequences of another skeptical scenario S2 (FWS) that 
discards T1. This implies the rejection of the so-called Moral Paralysis (MP) 
and shows a tension between Moral Skepticism (MS), ST and FWS. Moreover, 
the links between skepticism, dogmatism and atheism, as a case of epistemic 
defeasibility, are discussed.
Key Words: Skeptical Theism; Free Will Skepticism; Evidential argument; Evil; 
Moral Paralysis. 
Resumen
En este artículo pretendo mostrar que el teísmo escéptico (TE) implica el 
rechazo del escepticismo sobre el libre albedrío (ELA). Lo anterior resulta 
debido a que TE sostiene el denominado argumento evidencial del mal contra 
el teísmo. Dicho argumento presupone el libre albedrío (como una premisa 
oculta), conduciendo hacia una conclusión escéptica sin cuestionar si quiera 
la posibilidad de ELA. Afirmo, entonces, que este tipo de conflicto entre dos 
escenarios escépticos remueve la validez tanto de TE como de ELA: resulta ad 
hoc asumir un escenario escéptico E1 (TE), el cual apoya la tesis T1, y que 
implícitamente rechaza las consecuencias de otro escenario escéptico E2 (ELA) 
que descarta T1. Lo anterior implica el rechazo de la denominada parálisis 
moral (PM) y revela una tensión entre el escepticismo moral (EM), TE y ELA. 
Adicionalmente, se discuten las conexiones entre escepticismo, dogmatismo y 
ateísmo como un caso de refutabilidad epistémica.
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Palabras clave: Teísmo Escéptico, Escepticismo sobre el libre albedrío, 
Argumento Evidencial, Mal, Parálisis Moral.
Resumo
Nesse artigo tento demostrar que o teísmo cético (ST por sua sigla em inglês) 
implica a rejeição do ceticismo do livre alvedrio (FWS por sua sigla em inglês). 
Isso devido a que o teísmo cético (ST) admite um suposto argumento evidente do 
mal contra o teísmo. Esse argumento pressupõe o livre alvedrio (como premissa 
oculta), para conduzir desse modo a uma conclusão cética sem problematizar, 
primeiramente, a legitimidade do ceticismo do livre alvedrio (FWS). A meu 
ver, esse tipo de conflito entre dois cenários céticos elimina a validade do teísmo 
cético (ST) e do ceticismo do livre alvedrio (FWS): isto é assumir ad hoc um 
cenário cético S1(teísmo cético) que afirma a tese T1, mas implicitamente rejeita 
as consequências do outro cenário cético S2 (ceticismo do livre alvedrio) que 
desconsidera T1. Isso indica a rejeição da suposta Paralisia Moral (MP) e aponta 
à tensão entre o ceticismo moral (MS), o teísmo cético (ST) e o ceticismo do 
livre alvedrio (FWS). Além disso, problematizam-se as relações entre ceticismo, 
dogmatismo e ateísmo, como um caso de improbabilidade epistêmica.
Palavras-chave: teísmo cético, ceticismo do livre alvedrio; argumento evidente; 
mal; paralisia moral.
I
In this paper, my aim is to highlight a tension between two kinds of local 
skepticism and the practical-moral consequences of this conflict. By doing 
this, I hope to develop a new approach concerning the implausibility 
of affirming such skeptical theses in the first place. This enterprise is 
strengthened if there are intrinsic inconsistencies in the premises (implicitly 
or explicitly) or in the conclusions (and what follows from these conclusions) 
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of a skeptical scenario. Incompatibility of two local skepticisms, and the 
implausibility of the practical-moral consequences of such incompatibility, 
shows that skepticism is false, at least in these local cases. Put this way, the 
debate focuses on the hypotheses regarding the impossibility of showing 
that skepticism, broadly speaking, is false. Usually related to the subjective 
state of a subject S, to say that a skeptical scenario is false applies to cases 
where a criterion to discriminate between real cases and merely truthlike 
cases is found. I will try to show the falsity of the skeptical cases studied, 
appealing to an a priori inconsistency. My main point here is to show that 
this conflict between skeptical positions undermines both. Thus, it follows 
that not empirical evidence is required against skepticism, it suffices to find 
an a priori inconsistency. In other cases, like in the problem of pointless 
evil in the actual world, empirical evidence is more much appealing. It is 
important to bear in mind that one of the most difficult questions about 
skepticism is the indiscernibility criterion, that is, sharing (apparently) the 
same properties between a skeptical scenario and the nonskeptical situation. 
It is paradoxical (to say the less) that it is possible to affirm skepticism 
through indiscernibility, because in such a scenario what is true or false is 
not knowable. The mere possibility, the conceivability that I am a brain 
in a vat, seems to discredit that I know that I am not a brain in a vat. The 
modal epistemic link is very simple and has been widely discussed. Skeptical 
scenarios that could not be tested in the first place cannot be discarded. So, 
it does not follow from
K ¬ p (“I know that I am not a brain in a vat”)
That 
K ¬ ◊ p (“I know that it is impossible that I am a brain in a vat”)
With restrictions like this, the skeptical slippery slope is avoided, at least 
in cases of thought experiments empirically uninformed. Could something 
similar with the tension that I observe between Skeptical Theism and Free 
Will Skepticism be done? 
In a nutshell, Skeptical Theism (henceforth, ST) is “a strategy for 
bringing human cognitive limitations to bear in reply to arguments from 
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evil against the existence of God.” (Dougherty, 2014) Question one: Does 
this kind of local skepticism (since it is about knowledge of the reasons 
God might have for allowing apparently gratuitous evil, and not about 
knowledge simpliciter) presuppose or assume that a subject S can freely 
decide to do what is wrong? Question two: Could there be any case or 
instance of gratuitous evil without free will? My main hypothesis is that this 
is not possible, and therefore ST demands rejecting Free Will Skepticism 
(henceforth, FWS). Since Alston (1991) and Howard-Snyder & Bergmann 
(2004) have developed a skeptical argument about the so-called problem of 
evil, it seems to be an implicit premise that without free will it is impossible 
to affirm gratuitous evil. Why is this so? Fundamentally, because the dialectic 
strategy against theism was not only to show the epistemic limitations of 
humans to know the reasons God might have for allowing some kinds 
of evils, but, at the same time, to put pressure on the idea that there is 
justification for evil in the first place. These notions (evil facts, evil actions 
and evil decisions) seem to presume free will; otherwise, the presence of 
evil in the world would be attributed to God. In fact, the standard defense 
(theodicy) aims at justifying the presence of evil in the world in order to 
achieve some greater good, with free will between them. Of course, this is 
not the central point of skeptical theism, at least not directly. It is, precisely, 
an implicit premise neither sustained nor argued. Rowe’s argument (since 
1979 until 2006) against the existence of God through pointless evil (or 
inscrutable evil) presupposes the possibility that pointless evil does not occur 
(that it is not necessary that there are pointless evils in the actual world); 
and this, again, presupposes free will. In this sense, my aim is to emphasize 
a tension between two kinds of skepticism and the moral consequences of 
this tension. Free will is taken for granted in the development of ST. Because 
free will is taken for granted, ST cannot be true or correct while FWS is 
also true or correct. That is: Both are inconsistent skeptical theses. FWS is 
a position that holds the thesis that there is no free will, therefore rejecting 
the mere possibility that a subject S decides to do A or B, or rejecting the 
deliberative process implicit on free will scenarios (Vilhauer, 2012). On the 
other hand, the so-called arguments from evil hold that at least some evils in 
the world are gratuitous or pointless, and, therefore, unjustified, assuming 
in this proposal that there is free will (Rowe, 1979; Howard-Snyder & 
Bergmann2004). About this, O´Connor (2010) states that (2010):
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It is also presumed that human beings are free and responsible (on pain of 
attributing evil in the world to God alone, and so impugning His perfect 
goodness). Hence, those who believe that God is omni-determining 
typically are compatibilists with respect to freedom and (in this case) 
theological determinism. (p. 15)
This tension between ST and FWS shows that both proposals cannot 
be correct (if they are) simultaneously. This suggests that, paradoxically, a 
skeptical position demands some certainty: The certainty that what cannot 
be known is false by default. This has been discussed recently by Parker & 
Ian (2018). According to them, certainty about a belief B has a psychological 
background, which explains the link between certainty and dogmatism 
concerning skepticism: “Dogmatism can be understood as an unwavering 
conviction in one’s beliefs and is further characterized by a failure to revise 
beliefs when confronted by contradictory evidence.” (p. 158)
This means that there is no revision of this belief, it is not falsifiable. 
Skepticism seems to follow this path. The central point here is that 
conceptual inconsistency (a priori inconsistency) accomplishes the task of 
counterevidence, putting pressure on the conviction about skepticism. It 
is in this sense that a skeptical position could be understood as dogmatic, 
because it is a belief about the unknowability (henceforth, BU) of p with 
certainty, independent of the counterevidence against BU3. If this was 
the case with ST and FWS, it is implicit that there is no evidence that 
could defeat any of them or both. But the evidential argument from evil 
demands an evidentialist position, which, at the same time, lets the door 
to counterevidence against such a kind of argument open: It has a potential 
defeater and so, it is potentially false. This is a key issue for any skeptical 
position, because, prima facie, their truth value cannot be questioned without 
losing the main point of skepticism. As Maia (2002) points out, there is a 
limit to doubting: The moral (and political) consequences of skepticism. 
3 Following Lom (2001), an example of this kind of dogmatism is Nietzschean 
nihilism. According to Lom, on the path to questioning the value of moral positions, 
Nietzsche does not analyze the moral implications of nihilism, because it is a case 
of what is beyond doubt. According to Maia (2002, p. 551), Lom understands 
dogmatic nihilism as the belief that there is no value.
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This means that practical consequences of skeptical scenarios should be 
considered at the moment of pondering their validity, if any. 
On the other hand, FWS cannot be correct without evidence against 
free will, which suggests that besides being inconsistent with ST, FWS lacks 
epistemic justification. This suggests that skeptical hypotheses are cases of 
maladaptive beliefs, that is, beliefs that have an epistemic defect in their 
process of forming a belief. The so-called default mode network (henceforth, 
DMN), understood as the way through which subjects know automatically 
and intuitively (Parker & Ian, 2018, p. 162), suggests that some processes 
of belief/disbelief rely on analytic-empirical paths (Task positive network, 
TPN), which are centered on analytic and logical non social process. 
Precisely, TPN is the kind of process associated with disbelief and, therefore, 
with skepticism as a case of certainty about disbelief. About this, they hold 
that: “…nonreligious individuals may be inclined to produce messages 
which emphasize analytic/empirical arguments.” (Parker & Ian, 2018, p. 
183) In cases like this, it is relevant to bear in mind that nonreligious is a 
wider category than skeptical. The absence of certainty is understood as the 
possibility of nondogmatic position, for instance, in the case of an agnostic in 
contrast to an atheist (the latter being a case of dogmatism). 
II
Bearing this in mind, Rutledge (2017 p. 263) has proposed recently 
a link between Moral Skepticism (MS) and ST, through what he calls 
Moral Paralysis (MP). As was reviewed in I, ST states that we do not have 
completely epistemic access to the existence of God. What is worse, ST tries 
to respond to arguments that state we have evidence against such existence. 
Particularly, the evidential argument from evil, which states that we have 
evidence against the existence of God through evil, conducts to a skeptical 
position not only about our knowledge of God, but about the reality of the 
object of that knowledge. In the words of Rutledge (2017), ST holds: “ST: 
We have no good reason for thinking that the goods, evils and entailment 
relations between them of which we are aware are representative of the 
goods, evils, and entailment relations between them that there are.” (p. 263)
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In other words, the fallibility and finitude of our knowledge would 
not allow us an access to the foundation of what is good and evil. Does 
this preclude also that a subject S takes certain decisions, specifically moral 
decisions, freely? This would be the case because ST stresses the reasons why 
some action could be understood as good or evil. That there are better or worse 
decisions seems to rely on the grounds of epistemic access to the criteria that 
make an action A better than B. In fact, one of the aspects that the argument 
from evil highlights is that not all events of evil seem to preclude gratuitous 
or pointless evil, cases in which there is not an ultimate event of goodness 
that justifies that evil, at least as far as S knows. As Dougherty (2016) points 
out, this is the central topic of the argument from evil:
We will say that an evil, E, is ‘pointless’ or ‘unjustified’ if and only if there 
is no all-things-considered sufficient reason for God to allow it… Since on 
the present notion of pointlessness, the existence of unjustified evil is not 
compatible with the existence of God –that is, no possible world contains 
both God and unjustified evil. (p. 2)
Since William Rowe (1988), this has been the central point of the 
argument, mainly because it is this kind of events which seem to preclude 
the existence of God. Moreover, the example of Rowe (2004) is strengthened 
through the criteria of horrendous evil (not only gratuitous): 
A fawn is horribly burned in a forest fire caused by lightning. It lies on 
the forest floor suffering terribly for five days before death relieves it of 
its suffering.
A five-year-old girl is brutally beaten, raped, and strangled in Flint, 
Michigan, on New Year’s day a few years ago.
The theist must believe that for each of these evils there is some greater 
good to which it leads, a good that an all-powerful being simply could 
not realize without permitting that evil. (pp. 5-6)
Rowe says that theist must believe, pursuing a reductio ad absurdum in 
case the theist agrees that there is no greater good behind those events. ST 
highlights the assumption, considering that an evidentialist position must 
agree with the limits of knowledge and, through this, with the prima facie 
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inscrutability of some events of evil. More recently, Trakakis (2007) has gone 
one step further, presenting a real case. This demands, at least, the absence 
of evidence against the pointless criterion. Another example of pointless 
evil seems to be the slaughter in Las Vegas on 2017. Not without reason, 
the media called this action senseless evil:
Many of Trump’s conservative Christian supporters praised his moral 
clarity. Evil is as evil does, they said, and if anything could be called evil, 
it is the senseless slaughter of people enjoying music on a Sunday night, 
unaware that a mass murderer loomed high above in a hotel suite. As 
remarks Susan Neiman, types of evils put some clarity between natural - 
moral, but the case of a deer burning for natural causes does not satisfy 
at all (is not her fault).4
Cases like this make the atheist rhetoric particularly strong, because 
beyond the epistemic discussion lies something indubitable: Actions like this 
would be intuitively better not to occur. The jump from this to the negation 
of the existence of God is the main point of discussion and does not mean 
to affirm simpliciter that there is no senseless evil. Moreover, the dichotomy 
natural evil – moral evil is not the central point here, since the theodicy’s 
edge is not the main purpose of this paper. 
III
So: Is it ST in a better epistemic position that atheism? Perhaps not, perhaps 
the best argument against pointless evil is the theist position, knowingly: 
Sustaining the inscrutability of some events of evil, indirectly rejecting the 
atheist assumption about pointless evil. This can be done, even if ST accepts 
that there is, in fact, horrendous evil. Of course, here inscrutability could not 
be understood as Rowe does and Dougherty (2016, p. 4) analyses: Pointless 
by default or which  seems  pointless. This assumption is epistemically 
unfounded and the theist position (including ST) does not have to assume 
plausibility of the link between:
4  http://edition.cnn.com/2017/10/08/us/las-vegas-evil-debate/ 
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i) Horrendous evil – Pointless evil. 
Conceptually, there is a non sequitur here. This is so, basically, because 
there is a link or, more cautiously, it is possible that there could exist the link. 
ii) Horrendous evil – Justified evil.
The main point is that horrendous and pointless have different conceptual 
content, they are not semantically equivalent concepts. So, the atheist 
that defends the evidential argument from evil must show that: a) an evil 
is pointless not because it is horrendous. Or, following Dougherty (2016): 
“Skeptical theists point out that absence of evidence is not always evidence 
of absence.” (p. 5) The evidentialist assumption seems to preclude this 
possibility; It seems to demand that if there is evidence against pointless 
evils (that there is no such a thing as pointless evils), that should be evident, 
empirically evident. At this point, it is important to bear in mind that for 
the atheist the following distinction does not really matter:
iii) Justified evil – Pointless evil.
This is so because for atheism b) there is no justifier that justified evil 
in the first place. So, the evidential argument from evil puts pressure on 
the distinction justified-pointless without accepting the same thing (only 
assuming it for the sake of argument). Either way, this analysis shows that the 
dilemma that sustains MP does not hold, because the success of evidential 
argument from evil is not assured no matter what, which relates to the first 
horn of the dilemma. MP emerges at this point when a subject S has to make 
a rational decision that would be the better all things considered. Since there 
is no such an epistemic access to “all things considered”, because there is no 
access to all the consequences of an action A, the subject S could take the 
paralysis option, not to do A5. Here is an example of MP and the eventual 
consequences of the same:
5 An example of this on the public media is the zugzwang move (from chess), which 
appears at the end of the movie Mr. Nobody.
 http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0485947/?ref_=nv_sr_1 
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Suppose that Bethany witnesses a young child torturing a puppy by spraying 
it with lighter fluid. Moreover, suppose that she notices a matchbox nearby, 
and the child begins to reach for it. As a conscientious endorser of ST, 
Bethany begins to deliberate about whether or not she should intervene (and 
let us add that the child in question is, conveniently, having considerable 
yet not insuperable difficulty striking the matches, allowing Bethany more 
than sufficient time, under normal circumstances, to deliberate). She 
thinks to herself, ‘Well, it’s obvious that I don’t know what the entailment 
relations are between the evil I am witnessing and other possible goods of 
much greater value. Given that I have no good reason to think my grasp 
of the realm of value is representative of how the realm of value really is, 
then, I should suspend my belief concerning whether intervening would 
be a morally obligatory action.’ (Rutledge, 2017, p. 264)
If this was the direct (or indirect, for what matters here) consequence of 
ST in the realm of morality, even the defender of the skeptical view would 
agree that it is an undesirable consequence, because the central point of ST 
and the argument from evil is not rejecting a deliberative process in human 
beings, but to show the epistemic blindness about the potential gratuity 
of certain evil events: The absence of necessity of some evil events, the so-
called greater good. However, it is important to note that even MP c) is a 
deliberative choice. In the example, Bethany decides not to intervene in the 
light of the potential counterintuitive consequences of doing so (preventing 
a major good). So, the problem is not that: 
iv) Bethany does not deliberate rationally the best way to act. In fact she does.
Instead, the problem is:
v) The potential generalization of such a decision in similar circumstances, 
that is, MP. 
This is the unacceptable consequence of ST, or so goes the argument 
against MP. Is that so? Prima facie, it seems that way, because the decision-
making process of a subject S in cases like this relies on d) the probable 
absence of reasons for acting, all things considered. However, this is not the 
case, because: 
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vi) ST does not require MS and, for what matters here, neither MP. 
In other words:
vii) MP is not an implicit premise of ST, contrary to the rejection of FWS 
discussed previously. 
So, there is a non sequitur holding MP from ST. Moreover, ST does 
not have (and is not supposed to have) practical consequences, besides the 
theoretical plausibility of ST itself.
IV
Rutledge’s (2017) central argument against ST is what he observes as 
a dilemma: “…either skeptical theism leads to moral skepticism or the 
evidential argument from evil succeeds. That is, the skeptical theist must 
choose one or the other of these unpalatable disjuncts.” (p. 265)
 It is worth asking if this dilemma is a problem for the skeptical theist 
or for the theist simpliciter. ST emerges as an alternative to the evidential 
argument from evil. As such, ST presupposes an incompatibilist view 
between God’s existence – Evil in the world. More precisely, between: 
viii) God’s existence – Unjustified (pointless) evil in the world. 
Unfortunately, the same argument that is useful for ST is used by the 
so-called new atheism to show that because there is an intrinsic epistemic 
limitation of a subject S on the argument from evil, such limitation avoids 
certainty on what the theist needs to affirm without doubt (without epistemic 
limitation) about God’s existence and about their goodness. Would the 
triumph of the argument from evil be an unpalatable consequence for ST? 
Why? By itself, this consideration undermines the dilemma, because there 
will not be such unpalatable consequence as MP. Beyond this hermeneutic 
question there is one much more difficult, namely: Why the argument 
from evil should have the practical consequence of MP? This is not clear. 
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For Rutledge (2017), the central point is that MP is a consequence of MS, 
attending the criterion all things considered: 
1.  If ST is true, then we should be skeptical about the reliability of our 
all-things-considered value judgments.
2.  If we should be skeptical about the reliability of our all-things-
considered value judgments, then we are morally paralyzed (i.e. 
we cannot engage in moral deliberation on the basis of our value 
judgments).
3.  Therefore, if ST is true, then we are morally paralyzed (from 1 & 2).
4.  But it is absurd to believe that we are morally paralyzed (Premise).
5.  Therefore, it is not the case that ST is true (from 3 & 4). (p. 268)
At first sight, this may be understood as a proof against MP, only because 
it is assumed as “absurd” (premise 4). Notwithstanding, the central problem 
that I have been trying to emphasize here is that:
ix) ST cannot be true if FWS is true. 
If this is correct, the problem is with skeptical thesis simpliciter (any 
skeptical thesis). Following Caruso (2018), this seems to show that perhaps 
the problem is not MP, but MS. In fact, if the main point of questioning 
the deliberative process of making decisions (decisiveness) is to highlight the 
criterion of all things considered, then it is plausible to affirm that it does not 
matter if a subject S makes a decision based solely on some things considered, 
which is the most plausible scope for finite beings making finite decisions. 
This is what Caruso calls consequentialist-based approaches, because 
mainly forward-looking aspects of action are considered, not backward, in 
contrast with the so-called Desert-based approach. Caruso says about this 
(2018): 
Consequentialist-based approaches are forward-looking in the sense 
that agents are considered proper targets of reprobation or punishment 
for immoral actions on the grounds that such treatment will…prevent 
the agent (or other agents) from performing that type of action in the 
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future. Desert-based responsibility…is considered to be backward-looking 
and retributivist in the sense that any punitive attitudes or treatments 
that are deemed appropriate responses for an immoral act/decision are 
warranted simply by virtue of the action/decision itself, irrespective of 
whatever good or bad results might follow from the punitive responses.6 
(p. 3)
The final consequence of taking seriously MS is not theoretical, but 
mainly practical: It would be impossible to attribute responsibility for action 
A or B, whatever the consequences of these actions are. In this sense, MP only 
shows an extremely bizarre unpractical consequence of MS. It is important 
to bear in mind that MP only shows us the counterintuitive consequences of 
demanding all things considered to be the central point of a decision-making 
process. So, the focus of MP e) is not questioning if action A deserves praise or 
blame (central for MS positions), but to evaluate the mere possibility of making 
a decision in the first place. Then, we can affirm that this moral consequence 
(MP), concerning ST and FWS, lacks epistemic warrant because: 
x) The theoretical-practical analyses suggest that it is not correct to affirm 
MP in order to reject the evidential argument from evil.
At the same time:
xi) MP conflicts with FWS, showing that ST assumes the falsity of FWS, 
as it was intended in this paper.
If this is correct, the key point of this analysis is that the skeptical thesis 
has a central problem: f ) to assume without evidence the truth of the skeptical 
position. At this point, the tensions between ST, MS and FWS make possible 
to show what is the core of epistemic problems with skepticism simpliciter. 
6  About this, see also García (2018).
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